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1 例见Louis Putterman, “The Incentive Problem and the Demise of Team Farming in China”, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1987), pp. 103-127; Louis Putterman, “Ration Subsidies and Incentives in the Pre-reform Chinese Commune”, Economica, Vol. 55, No. 218 (1988), pp. 235-247; James K. Kung, “Egalitarianism, Subsistence Provision, and Work Incentives in China’s Agricultural Collectives”, World Development, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1994), pp. 175-187.
2 例见 Justin Y. Lin, “The Household Responsibility System in China’s Agricultural Reform: A Theoretical and Empirical Study”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1988), pp. S199-224; Justin Y. Lin, “Collectivization and China’s Agricultural Crisis in 1959-1961”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 6 (1990), pp. 1228-1252; Justin Y. Lin, “China: Farming Institutions and Rural Development”, in Mieke Meurs (ed.), Many Shades of Red: State Policy and Collective Agriculture (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 151-183; Peter Nolan, “De-collectivization of Agriculture in China, 1979-1982: A Long Term Perspective,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 3-4 (1983), pp. 381-403.
3 有关中国乡村社会中的陈规、惯例和话语系统对村民日常社会行为的影响的详细讨论，参见李怀印《华北村治：1875-1938年的获鹿县》一书（Li Huaiyin, Village Governance in North China, 1875-1936, Stanford University Press, 2005）。
4 参看 William Parish and Martin King Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978], p. 64; John P. Burns, Political Participation in Rural China [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988], 77); Richard Madsen, Morality and Power in a Chinese Village [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984], pp. 141, 237; Jonathan Unger, “Remuneration, Ideology, and Personal Interests in a Chinese Village, 1960-1980”, in William L. Parish [ed.], Chinese Rural Development: The Great Transformation [Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1985], pp. 117-140; Anita Chan, Richard Madsen, and Jonathan Unger, Chen Village Under Mao and Deng [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992], pp. 93, 249); and Helen F. Siu, Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural Revolution [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989], p. 231). 中文资料方面，可参看国家农业委员会《农业集体化重要文件汇编，1958-1981 》(北京: 中共中央党校出版社, 1981), p. 874.
5 有关其他地方乡村干部不愿实行计件制的情况，可参看David Zweig, “Peasants, Ideology, and New Incentive Systems: Jiangsu Province, 1978-1981,” in William L. Parish (ed.), Chinese Rural Development: The Great Transformation (Armonk: Sharpe, 1985), p. 146; Chan, Madsen, and Unger, Chen Village Under Mao and Deng, p. 249.
6国家在五十年代集体化初期即提倡计件制，在六十年代初大跃进过后，以及七十年代中后期为了纠正文革极左错误，提倡“各尽所能，按劳分配” 的社会主义原则，又一再强调使用计件记工。
7 有关大寨工分制在全国各地的实行情况，参见Jonathan Unger, “Remuneration, Ideology, and Personal Interests in a Chinese Village, 1960-1980”.
8 其他地方类似的现象，参见Laurel Bossen, Chinese Women and Rural Development: Sixty Years of Change in Lu Village, Yunnan (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), pp. 111-112.
9 有关此一问题的详细分析, 见李怀印Li Huaiyin, “Family Life Cycle and Peasant Income in Socialist China: Evidence from Qin Village”, Journal of Family History, Vol. 30, No. 1 (2005), pp. 121-138; and Li Huaiyin, “Life Cycle, Labor Remuneration, and Gender Inequality in a Chinese Agrarian Collective,” Journal of Peasant Studies, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2005).
10 县、社妇联联合调查组, “男女同工同酬政策好, 妇女发挥半边天作用大—— 志刚大队实行男女同工同酬的调查”。
11 县、社妇联联合调查组, 前揭文。
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